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Abstract: 
In 1997, Brazil approved a new law establishing the regulatory framework of oil and 
gas industry. One of the most important changes was the distribution of petroleum rents 
to states and Municipalities. The volume received by each municipality varies 
considerably, since it depends on a range of criteria that measure the impact of 
upstream activities on the specific municipality as well as the number of productive 
wells next to it. This paper aims at evaluating whether municipalities eligible to receive 
royalties exhibited a lower fiscal effort than the non-eligible ones. We use the local 
collection of Urban Property Tax (IPTU) as a measure of fiscal effort, after controlling 
for fiscal capacity of each municipality. We also assess whether municipalities are 
obeying requirements of spending oil rents, by measuring the impact of such rents on 
specific items of the budget, like personal, health, education and investment expenses.  
The data set comprehends about 4000 municipalities observed during seven years (from 
1999 to 2005). We used the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator in a dynamic panel with 
fixed effects. Results allow concluding that windfall oil rents in fact reduces fiscal effort 
and increases the allocation of budgetary resources on investment, but the share of 
budget allocated on health, education, energy and housing expenses did not changed as 
consequence of oil royalties.   
Keywords: fiscal federalism, windfall oil rents, fiscal effort, public spending. 
JEL Classification: H71, H75. 
 
Resumo: 
Em 1997, o Brasil aprovou nova lei que estabelece o marco regulatório da indústria 
petrolífera e do gás. Foram estabelecidos novos critérios de distribuição de rendas do 
petróleo para os Estados e Municípios. O volume recebido por cada município varia 
consideravelmente, uma vez que depende de uma série de critérios que medem o 
impacto das atividades de produção de petróleo sobre o Município, bem como o número 
de poços adjacentes. Este trabalho visa avaliar se os municípios beneficiados com 
royalties apresentam um esforço fiscal menor que os não-beneficiados. Usamos a receita 
local de IPTU como uma medida do esforço fiscal, após o controlar pela capacidade 
fiscal de cada município. Também avalia se os municípios estão cumprindo exigências 
de gastos de recursos do petróleo, medindo o impacto de tais rendas sobre itens 
específicos do orçamento, como despesas de pessoal, saúde, educação e investimento. O 
conjunto de dados compreende cerca de 4.000 municípios observados durante sete anos 
(de 1999 a 2005). Utilizamos o estimador de Arellano-Bond em um painel dinâmico de 
efeitos fixos. Os resultados permitem concluir que as rendas petrolíferas reduzem 
esforço fiscal e aumentam a alocação dos recursos orçamentários em investimento, mas 
a fração do orçamento destinado à saúde, educação, energia e habitação despesas não 
mudou como conseqüência de royalties do petróleo.  
Palavras-chave: federalismo fiscal, rendas petrolíferas, esforço fiscal, despesa pública. 
JEL: H71, H75. 
 Área 4: Economia do Setor Público.   
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1.  Introduction  
In the 1990s Brazil reformed the regulatory benchmark of its oil and gas 
industry.  The approval of the law 9478/97 implied that a portion of petroleum rent 
should be shared with producer municipalities in a new basis: all concessionaires must 
pay royalties to the government, with 10% ad valorem tax over the gross value of 
production. After 1997, this tax base started to be calculated based on international 
prices, instead of refining prices as before after collecting royalties, the Federal 
Treasury distributes them to a selected set of states and Municipalities that fulfill some 
criteria regarding the production and transportation of oil.  
   The law benefited about 800 municipalities (among the universe of 5500). The 
volume received by each municipality varies considerably, since it depends on a range 
of criteria that measure the impact of upstream activities on the specific municipality as 
well as the number of productive wells next to it.  The law obligates the municipalities 
to invest royalties in specific items, the most part of them linked to investment in 
infrastructure. 
The argument for municipalities to receive additional financial revenues would 
be that this is a way to compensate them for the oil exploitation in their territories or 
neighboring areas. 
 
Such revenues are classified as intergovernmental transfers since the resources 
belong to the Union that transfers them to sub national governments. These transfers are 
mandatory, unconditional and without exchange, and dependent on the local oil 
production. The Union is obligated to make the transfer as constitutional requirement. 
The Municipality has some freedom to allocate resources and is not required to 
supplement the funds received. 
 
The key role of financial compensation is to make compatible intergenerational 
interests (Friedmann and Montalvão, 2003; Serra, 2003). Since oil is a finite resource, 
its use today turns it impossible to be extracted any time in the future. Thus, the 
imposition of financial compensation would charge the extraction with an additional 
cost, reducing its production relative to the optimum and allowing future generations to 
access to income generated by this natural resource. Furthermore, the additional revenue 
arising from the compensation should be invested in durable assets (infrastructure, 
environmental preservation) that can be enjoyed by future generations, compensating 
them in part by the previous consumption of non-renewable resources (Hartwick, 1977). 
 
The problem is that the municipalities where the extractive activity occurs 
should be exactly offset by the costs they incur to support the extraction of oil, as 
construction of drainage channels for the production, provision of public services for 
exploratory businesses and its employees, etc., and one additional for  future investment 
in assets. In practice, however, transfers go far beyond that. Some municipalities receive 
amounts representing significant fraction of their ordinary revenues. The table 1 
illustrates the dependence of some municipalities within the two most benefited 
Brazilian states in 2005. Some municipalities have almost half of its revenue budget 
linked to oil royalties. 
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Rio de Janeiro  46  14.60% 11.08%  0.57%  43.97% 
Rio Grande do Norte  60  3.50%  7.44%  0.40%  47.19% 
Source: ANP and National Treasury. Considering only eligible districts. 
 
It is believed that this windfall revenue due to royalty transfers led to (i) 
implementation of public projects with low marginal social return; (ii) reduction of tax 
effort; (iii) corruption; (iv) inefficiency. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of large fiscal windfalls 
operating through the government. More precisely, we evaluate whether municipalities 
eligible to receive royalties exhibit different fiscal behavior when compared to non-
eligible ones in two ways:  lower fiscal effort and high level of expenditures and 
investment.  
We use the local collection of property tax – IPTU– as a measure of fiscal effort, 
and expenditures on various budgetary items, after controlling for fiscal capacity of 
each municipality. The data set comprehends budgetary data from 4000 municipalities 
observed during seven years (from 1999 to 2005). With the purpose of controlling for 
possible endogenous effects of transfers, we use the Arellano-Bond estimator. Results 
allow us to conclude that the higher the volume of received royalties, the lower the 
revenues of taxes associated to collection effort, the lower current spending and the 
higher the investment. 
This issue is highly relevant given the announcement of the new exploratory 
frontier in the pre-salt layer of the ocean in 2008. The new reserves can increase 
substantially petroleum rents in the hands of municipalities in the next years, and an 
adequate understanding of the fiscal behavior on impacted cities can contribute to 
design better rules for the optimum use of such revenues by local governments.  
  The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents an overview on the new 
regulatory environment of oil industry in Brazil as well as some remarks about the fiscal 
federalism and the rationale for sharing oil rents with federative entities; section 3 
describes the data set and some descriptive statistics; section 4 presents the model to 
assess evidence of low fiscal effort on benefited districts and comment its results; 
section 5  presents the model to assess the impact of royalty revenues on some 
component of Municipal spending and the results; the last section brings some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Brazilian oil rents and fiscal federalism 
The Federal Government provides a subset of Brazilian municipalities with a 
financial compensation in the form of a percentage of collected petroleum rents 
(royalties) in order to offset possible deleterious effects of oil and gas production over 
their economies. 
Federal Law 9478 of 1997 (the so-called “Petroleum Law) is the starting point of 
the new regulatory framework for the oil market, securing a significant portion of 
royalties for the municipalities affected by the oil and gas upstream sector.    4
The law also introduced new rules to calculate royalties to be shared among 
eligible municipalities that meet specific criteria, like being directly or indirectly 
impacted by oil and gas upstream activities and/or being a producing area
1.  
Like many other countries, Brazil runs a special fiscal regime over oil and gas 
production. The most important tax is the ‘Royalty’, composed by a 10 percent-rate 
over the gross value of crude oil or gas production. Funds raised are shared among 
producing States and Municipalities, the National Treasury, the Secretariat of Science 
and Technology and the Navy. Municipalities impacted by the oil industry are also 
entitled to receive such revenues. 
Besides royalties, another important tax is the Special Participation Fee. This 
modality is applied in a progressive basis over the net revenue of production and does 
not charge all projects, but only the most profitable ones. Funds collected through 
special participation are shared among states, producing Municipalities
2, the Secretariat 
of Mining and Energy and the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources.
 3 
The law 9478 also allowed municipalities to invest royalty funds in a larger 
number of projects, whereas the previous restricted considerably such possibilities (only 
investments in energy, environment and sewage were allowed). Under the rules from 
1997, royalty funds cannot be allocated to debt management and payroll administration. 
An important characteristic of the system is that petroleum royalties are 
calculated based on international prices (instead of domestic refining prices), which 
turns such revenues very sensitive to the oscillation of oil prices and exchange rates. 
The new law also enlarged significantly the set of municipalities eligible for receiving 
royalties. With the substantial climb in the international oil value after 1999 and the 
collapse of fixed exchange regime in Brazil in 1999, royalty revenues in the hands of 
local districts increased very strongly, as we can see in figure 1. 
Figure 1: Royalty revenues and portion shared with Municipalities in Brazil, in billions of dollars
4.  
 
Source: National Petroleum Agency – ANP.  
                                                 
1 The most part of the Brazilian oil production is extracted offshore. The characterization as a producing 
municipality depends on the projection of its territorial circumscription to the sea.  
2 About two dozens Municipalities receive Special Participation.  
3Details about each tax are in the Presidential Decree 2.705/1998. 
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There is a wide range of studies about the relationship among intergovernmental 
transfers, fiscal effort and expenditures in Brazil. Such studies gained momentum after 
the Constitution of 1988, which produced an incomplete decentralization (Reis and 
Blanco, 1996), that is, the expansion of the shares of municipal levels on tax resources 
without the corresponding increase in their costs and responsibilities for the expenses.  
Shah (1994), in a study involving several emerging and developing countries, 
gathers evidence suggesting that transfers induce municipalities to under-use their own 
tax base. On the specific case of Brazil, the study concludes that the fiscal effort is not 
satisfactorily taken into account in the design of constitutional transfers, which 
ultimately benefit larger cities. 
Blanco (1998) concludes that there is a negative relationship between the fiscal 
effort and intergovernmental transfers, since municipalities highly dependent on federal 
transfers tend to reduce their own effort to collect taxes. Ribeiro and Shikida (2000) 
reach the same conclusion for a sample of municipalities of the Minas Gerais state. 
Reis and Blanco (1996) develop certain concepts of efficiency and tax capacity, 
presenting their determinants for each federative unit. Using the stochastic frontier 
method (Battese, 1992), the authors conclude that there is great disparity in tax 
efficiencies within the Brazilian states, resulting from huge differences in the degree of 
development across regions. From 1970 to 1990, they estimate that the average tax 
efficiency
5 of the Brazilian municipalities is around 0.83, with an outstanding 
performance for Sao Paulo’s municipalities (mean 0.93), the richest federative unit. 
By building an index of tax effort, Ribeiro (2005) proposes a model to measure 
the impact of intergovernmental transfers on fiscal effort. His model assumes that fiscal 
effort is negatively related to intergovernmental transfers. However, the author founded 
positive relationship in some cities, which is explained as specific characteristics of 
these municipalities.  
Focusing on the spending side, several empirical studies have shown that 
intergovernmental transfers have a greater effect on expenditure of cities receiving such 
transfers than a corresponding increase in income of its taxpayers. This is called 
flypaper effect. Inman (2008) and Gamkhar and Shah (2007) provide overviews of 
theoretical explanations and empirical evidences on the flypaper effect. 
Inman (2008) discusses the origins and the theoretical development of the 
flypaper effect, listing four possible explanations for the phenomenon. The author 
rejects econometric-based explanations (omitted variable, problems of specification, 
incomplete data) and attributes the flypaper effect to political reasons and "contract 
failure" between voters and elected legislators. Also Dahlby (2009) presents theoretical 
considerations on flypaper effect, attributing it to the fact that local governments finance 
their spending with distorting taxes and the lump-sum transfers make possible to reduce 
the marginal cost of public funds, allowing supply public goods at a lower shadow cost.  
                                                 
5 In a stochastic frontier model, the tax efficiency is estimated as the ratio between the variance of the 
technical efficiency (u) and the variance of the model (u + v).     6
Using techniques of spatial econometrics, Cossio and Carvalho (2001) found 
evidence of flypaper effect in the Brazilian federal system, insofar as the constitutional 
transfers induce a raise in expenses in larger amounts than the increase in municipal 
GDP per capita. 
Studies on the effects of royalties on the municipal finances are much more 
limited. The criteria governing the distribution of oil royalties in Brazil are not subject 
to the same logic than the fiscal federalism, as the reduction of regional inequalities 
(Dixit and Lodregan, 1998), sharing of risk and stabilization of idiosyncratic shocks 
(Persson and Tabellini, 1996). Oil rents, according to guidelines from law 9478, are 
shared with the localities following two principles: i) the municipality must be labeled 
as "producer", ii) the municipality must be directly or indirectly affected by activities of 
oil production. 
The natural question emerging is whether Municipalities entitled to receive oil 
royalties have suffered the same effects of regular transfers in terms of fiscal efforts and 
budgetary expenses. Some studies have been investigating the impact of royalties on 
localities in Brazil after the Petroleum Law was enacted. Such studies have focused on 
social changes and fiscal behavior of eligible municipalities.  
Leal and Serra (2002) studied the destination of royalty revenues in 
municipalities located in northern Rio de Janeiro State. They concluded that the volume 
of investments made by eligible municipalities was above that of the state’s average, but 
the investment-royalties ratio is consistently below one.  
Costa Nova (2005) examined various social indicators of some municipalities 
that received significant amounts of royalties in the state of Bahia to conclude that 
despite a relative surplus in the budget provided by royalty funds, such municipalities 
did not improve their social indicators significantly above the regional average. 
Navarro (2003) published a detailed case study about the destination of royalty 
revenues in the city of Campos dos Goytacazes, state of Rio de Janeiro, the largest city 
benefiting from such resources in absolute values. His founds suggest that according to 
him, the Human Development Index evolved slightly above the regional average in the 
1990s. Moreover, Campos dos Goytacazes has increased its investments in sewage and 
infrastructure, but at a lower pace than its increase in royalty rents. 
Bregman (2007) studied the relationship among capital expenses, investments 
and degree of dependence on resource rents from 1999 to 2005. By estimating a pooled 
regression in municipalities grouped by the amount of received royalties, the author 
concludes that the most royalty-dependent municipalities increased their capital 
expenses in the same extent than the received revenue.   
This paper aims at providing a more comprehensive study than the previous 
ones. With the purpose of controlling for possible endogenous effects of transfers, we 
employed dynamic panel-data with the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond, 
1991), which consists in a GMM with a combination of lagged independent variables as 
instruments. 
 
3.  The data 
The fiscal data were obtained from the National Treasury Secretary (STN-
Finbra) while the royalty revenues were get from the National Petroleum Agency   7
(ANP). The data regarding Municipal GDP and population are from IBGE, the 
Brazilian Geography and Statistics Institute. The combination of these data sets resulted 
in a unbalanced panel
6 composed by around 5,000 Municipalities from 1999 to 2005. 
Among those Municipalities, around 500 are eligible for receiving royalties due to the 
new law.  
   
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, from 1999 to 2005. 






















Royalties   4103 2.93  7.52  7.9E-04 67.94 38956 0  0  0  0 
Personal   4103 56.54  14.3  0  98.54  38944 48.58 14.63  0  100 
Cost   4103 80.12  10.2  22.45  99.8  38953 77.1  10.71  0  100 
Investment  4103  13.4  8.77  0 71.43  38953 13.13 8.82  0 92.35 
IPTU per capita (R$)  3965 19.34  70.4  1.1E-04 1748.18 36578 10.24 28.41  3.3E-07 1781.93
Source: Own elaboration, based on data from ANP and National Treasury. Royalties expressed relative to 
Municipal revenues, in %; Personal expenses, cost expenses and investments are expressed relative to the 
budgetary spending, in %.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics about the data. As one can see, the 
royalty-budgetary revenue ratio varies substantially across the eligible Municipalities
7. 
On average, royalty beneficiaries have exhibited 2.93 of their budgetary revenues with 
such resources from 1999 to 2005. It is interesting to notice that the relative personal 
expenses are higher in eligible districts than in non-eligible ones (56.54% against 
48.58%), while the average relative investment seems to be the same between both 
groups (around 13%).   
 
4.  Resource abundance and taxation 
As reported in the previous sections, the literature about fiscal federalism in 
Brazil brings evidence on reduced fiscal efficiency of Municipalities highly dependent 
on grants of federal government. With the purpose of investigating whether oil rents 
generate similar effects, we have estimated the following dynamic panel model:  
 
log(IPTU_PC)it = αi + δ log(IPTU_PC)it-1+ γELIGit + β1log(1 + ROY_REV)it + 
β2log(GDP_PC)it + β3log(POP)it + β4log(FPM_REV)it + β5log(AGR_GDP)it + εit                   
( 1) 
Where: 
IPTU_PCit:  the Property tax collection (IPTU) per capita of Municipality i in year t; 
ELIGit: Dummy for eligible Municipality; 
ROY_REVit: royalty-revenues ratio of Municipality i in year t; 
GDP_PCit: Municipal GDP per capita; 
POPit: Population of Municipality i in year t; 
                                                 
6 The number of eligible municipalities in our dataset varies over years due to data availability.  
7 There is a discussion today in Brazil about the creation of fairer criteria for sharing royalties, since the 
current rules benefit much more a restricted set of municipalities over others.    8
FPM_REVit: Constitutional transfers
8 to Municipality i in year t relative to the 
Municipal revenue; 
AGR_GDPit: share of agricultural GDP on Municipal GDP. 
αi: fixed effect.  
εit: White Noise.  
The use of the Urban Property Tax per capita (IPTU_PC) as a measure of fiscal 
effort can be justified by the nature of this tax, whose collection depends not only on 
Municipal income, but also on aliquots and supervisory procedures. The lagged value is 
also added among the covariates in the dynamic model.  
The degree of dependence of Municipal finance on oil rents is measure by the 
ratio between royalty revenues and the whole revenue (ROY_REV). Since the most part 
of Municipalities do not receive royalties, we took the log of the sum of this variable 
with 1. The higher this ratio, the higher the Municipality’s finance depend on oil rents.    
The dummy ELIG aims to capture possible specificity of Municipalities entitled 
to receive oil rents through royalties under the 9478 law. Such Municipalities are 
considered oil producers or their economies are impacted by activities of the oil and gas 
industry. The dummy searches for possible different pattern of tax collection in 
producer (or impacted) localities.   
GDP_PC aims to control for the fiscal capacity, since localities with high 
income per capita are able to collect more taxes from their taxpayers. The population 
(POP) controls for the size of each Municipality. The share of agricultural GDP over 
Municipal product is added to control for the tax base, since IPTU is urban tax that 
levies on urban properties and the responsibility for the collection belongs to the city 
hall.  
OLS estimation of equation (1) leads to biased estimates of δ and β, because the 
lagged dependent variable induces a correlation the error and independent variables. 
Trying to overcome this problem, the coefficients were estimated by the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) using the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond, 
1991), which consists in employing the sequence of lagged variables as instruments. 
GMM also allows controlling for possible endogenous effects that can emerge from 
fiscal variables, since poor Municipalities, with reduced fiscal capacity, are firstly 
eligible to receive mandatory federal funds.    
Table 3 summarizes the results. Specification 2 tries to control for political 
factors leading to fiscal effort, with dummies for the political party in the Municipal 
power each year. The estimated coefficients show that high levels of royalties induce 
lower collection of Urban Property Tax per capita: on average, 1%-increase in royalty-
revenues ratio reduces the IPTU per capita in 1.34%. Since the fiscal capacity is 
assumed to be controlled by income per capita, this result suggests that high level of 
royalties (relative to the budgetary revenue) leads to a decrease in fiscal effort. 




                                                 
8 FPM: Fundo de Participação dos Municípios.    9
 
Table 3: Results for Urban Property Tax (IPTU) per capita - Arellano and Bond 
Dependent variable: 
log(IPTU per capita) 
Independent 




  (0.029) (0.029)
0.143
* 0.144
*  ELIG 
(0.0788) (0.0787)





0.0466 0.0474 GDP_PC 
(0.0306) (0.0307)





    
-0.0092 -0.0092 FPM_REV 
(0.0124) (0.0124)
    
0.0118 0.0126 AGR_GDP 
(0.0210) (0.0211)









Obs. 18141  18119 
Panel 4621  4615 
chi2 3597  3937 
sig2 0.286  0.286 
(
***) Significant at 1%; (
**) significant at 5%; (
*) significant at 10%.  
Robust standard deviations in parenthesis.  
 
6. Resource abundance and spending 
   The question that remains to be answered is how local governments spend the 
money brought by oil. 
  The political –economy literature identifies two mechanisms through which 
resource abundance may affect spending that are particularly interesting for the 
Brazilian case. 
  The first one concerns the increased motivation to create government jobs to 
reward political supporters that results from the sudden increase in oil royalties 
(Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2002). The result would be a decline in labor supply 
and an increase in government employment.   
The second one concerns the decrease on the supply of public infrastructure that 
may follow the resource windfall. The larger amount of resources available to the   10
incumbent government due to the resource windfalls makes the desire to remain in 
power higher. At the same time, the outside pressure for the position also increases. The 
result is a reduction in the planning horizon of the incumbents. If it takes some time to 
infrastructure provide public and/or private benefits, the result is a reduction in its 
provision (Caselli, 2007). 
  The point is that the “Petroleum law” obligates the municipalities to invest the 
most part of its royalties in infrastructure. This fiscal rule has been adopted, as 
discussed before, to minimize the negative externalities for future generations due to 
resource exploitation, and if the rule is enforceable, it should imply an increase in 
infrastructure.
9 
  In order to test the effect of royalties on relative spending, we regress cost 
spending relative to budget, personal spending relative to budget and investment 
spending on royalties revenues and other control variables. Since we do not have data 
on number of employees we use current spending and personal spending instead. 
 
log(SPE_BUD)it =δ log(SPE_BUD)it-1 + γELIGit + β1log(1 + ROY_REV)it + 
β2log(GDP_PC)it + β3log(POP)it + β4log(FPM_REV)it + β5log(AGR_GDP)it + 
β6log(REV_GDP)+ εit                                                   (2) 
 
where SPE_BUD is the spending to budget ratio, is the REV_GDP is the budgetary 
revenue relative to the Municipal GDP. This aims to control for the size of each 
Municipal government.  
We initially run the regressions using as the dependent variable: cost, personal, 
and investment spending. Then we repeat the regressions using health, education, 
energy, and housing spending. 
The analysis of such types of spending is justified not only by the assumed 
effects of windfall revenues on the behavior of Municipal managers, but also because 
the Petroleum Law establishes guidelines for applying such rents. The oil royalties must 
be invested in infrastructure and the use of such resources to debt management and 
payroll is forbidden by the Courts of Auditors. Therefore, the result is very important to 
infer whether the law is enforceable, leading the municipalities to apply royalty 
revenues properly; if this is the case, we should observe a positive effect of royalties on 
investment and infrastructure spending, and a negative effect on cost and personal 
spending. 
All dependent variables were calculated relative to their national averages each 
year. The purpose of this device is to isolate local shocks from national macroeconomic 
shocks that affect the finance of all Municipalities. Therefore, each variable is above or 
below one whether is above or below the national average. 
As previously, we have adopted the Arellano-Bond estimator, with the purpose 
of dealing with the potential bias of estimator.     
 
                                                 
9 Here a fiscal rule is understood in a narrow way. It is “a statutory or constitutional restriction on fiscal 
policy that sets a specific limit on a fiscal indicator such as the budgetary balance, debt, spending, or 
taxation. In other words, the focus is restricted to rules that impose a specific, binding constraint on the 
government´s range of policy options” (Kennedy and Robbins , 2001, p. 2).   11 
Table 4: Results for spending: Cost, Personal and Investment 
  Dependent Variables, relative to budgetary expenses, in log.  
Cost Personal  Investment Cost Personal  Investment  Independent  variables (log) 








 (0.024)  (0.032)  (0.013)  (0.024)  (0.032)  (0.014) 
0.0150 0.0397
** -0.00520  0.0146 0.0399
** -0.00431  ELIG 







***  ROY_REV 







***  GDP_PC 







***  POP 







*  FPM_REV 







**  AGR_GDP 







***  REV_GDP 







***  Constant 
(0.489) (0.681)  -2.194  (0.489) (0.678)  -2.187 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Political party dummies  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
observations 19291  19283  18916  19246  19238  18872 
panel observations  4843  4842  4812  4833  4832  4801 
chi2 309.2  310.6  367.1  3175  469.1  437.1 
sig2 0.0126  0.0309  0.260  0.0125  0.0307  0.260 
(
***) Significant at 1%; (
**) significant at 5%; (
*) significant at 10%.  
Robust standard deviations in parenthesis.  
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Table 5: Results for expenses: Health, Education, Energy and Housing 
  Dependent Variables, relative to budgetary expenses, in log. 
  Health Education  Energy  Housing Health Education  Energy  Housing 










  (0.030) (0.044)  (0.032)  (0.024)  (0.030) (0.044)  (0.032)  (0.024) 
0.122
* 0.0117  -0.227  0.0882  0.122
* 0.0112  -0.234  0.0872  ELIG 
(0.0693) (0.0343) (0.222)  (0.0820)  (0.0691) (0.0341) (0.223)  (0.0814) 
0.193
* -0.00298 3.629 0.228 0.192
* -0.00371 4.130 0.228  ROY_REV 
(0.103) (0.0602) -3.684  (0.190)  (0.103) (0.0612) -3.758  (0.190) 
0.176
*** 0.00594  -0.812
** 0.210
** 0.177
*** 0.00624  -0.811
** 0.209
**  GDP_PC 
(0.0323) (0.0215) (0.335)  (0.0986)  (0.0321) (0.0217) (0.337)  (0.0986) 
0.0400 0.0686
* -0.675  -0.00802  0.0301 0.0680
* -0.651  0.000264  POP 







* 0.00755  FPM_REV 
(0.00679) (0.00857) (0.0610)  (0.0163)  (0.00678) (0.00857) (0.0611)  (0.0163) 
-0.00955 0.0187
*** -0.492
*** -0.0122  -0.00957  0.0185
*** -0.483
*** -0.0118  AGR_GDP 









**  REV_GDP 
(0.0297) (0.0198) (0.297)  (0.0942)  (0.0295) (0.0199) (0.299)  (0.0942) 
Year  dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Political party dummy  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
-0.511 -0.758
** 6.561  -0.118 -0.905  -0.730
* 6.337 0.534  Constant 
(0.568) (0.374) -6.467  -1.442  (0.600) (0.379) -6.582  -1.407 
Observations  19189 19256 3078  18324  19144 19211 3070  18284 
panel  observations  4832 4840  1371  4742  4822 4830  1369  4733 
chi2  0.0814 0.0431 1.303  0.345  0.0813 0.0432 1.308  0.344 
sig2  209.4 343.5  92.84  219.1  270.7 382.0 5636  270.6 
(
***) Significant at 1%; (
**) significant at 5%; (
*) significant at 10%.  
Robust standard deviations in parenthesis.    13
Tables 4 and 5 exhibit the results of equation (2). Table 4 summarizes the 
estimated coefficients for cost, personal and investment. The specifications labeled as 
(a) do not control for political party while the specifications (b) add dummies for the 
political party in charge that year. Results show that royalties reduced both the relative 
cost and personal expense in the budget of eligible municipalities: the elasticities of 
such variables in relation to royalty-revenues ratio are -0.29 and -0.35, respectively. 
Despite the small magnitude, the effect is statistically significant. Meanwhile, the 
impact of windfall revenues on investment is positive, with elasticity around +1.38.  
Both results suggest evidence that municipalities are respecting the guidelines 
from the Petroleum Law.  
However, eligible municipalities spend on average more on cost (statistically 
non-significant), on personal (statistically significant) than non-eligible municipalities. 
Also eligible municipalities spend less on investment (statistically non-significant) than 
non-eligible municipalities. 
The signals of control variables present the expected signs. Richer and more 
populous localities tend to invest a higher share of their budget and to spend a lower 
portion in ordinary expenses. Moreover, municipalities highly dependent on federal 
funds (FPM) spend a higher portion of their budget in cost and personal.  
Regarding specific items of the budget (Table 5), results are no significant. Only 
the share of health expenses have increased in the budget of eligible municipalities as 
consequence of windfall revenues, but the estimative is significant only at 10%-level. 
Besides, eligible municipalities spend on average more on health than non-eligible 
municipalities. Finally, Municipalities did not increase the share of the budget allocated 
to Education, Energy and Housing. 
     
7. Conclusions 
The Federal Government provides a subset of Brazilian municipalities with a 
financial compensation in the form of a percentage of collected petroleum rents 
(royalties) in order to offset possible deleterious effects of oil and gas production over 
their economies. 
Federal Law 9478 of 1997 (the so-called “Petroleum Law) is the starting point of 
the new regulatory framework for the oil market, securing a significant portion of 
royalties for the municipalities affected by the oil and gas upstream sector.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of large fiscal windfalls 
operating through the government. More precisely, we evaluate whether municipalities 
eligible to receive royalties exhibit different fiscal behavior when compared to non-
eligible ones. 
The results indicate that windfall oil rents reduce fiscal effort, increase 
investment, and do not affect health, education, energy and housing spending. 
Regarding the negative effects on fiscal effort, we can argue that in anticipation 
of revenue windfalls some municipalities must have decided to exploit less the potential 
of their existing taxes. Higher taxes are hard to explain to voters but not higher 
transfers.    14
Regarding the positive effects on investment, they do not give support to the 
political-economy models. It seems in fact that the law has been effective in the sense of 
compensating future generations. 
Finally, this study has some shortages to be overcome and several further 
developments are possible. A natural question emerging from this study is the quality of 
the increased investment we have detected. We also have tried to address the problem of 
endogeneity using a specific estimator, but other methods are also possible. 
Nevertheless, the assessment of the consequences of Petroleum Law (and more 
specifically the windfall revenues) on local finance is still in the beginning and this 
paper aims to provide new lights to the debate, which is getting more and more 
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